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Distinguishing between international design failures and national implementation 
problems is a subject of some concern in the area of international natural resource and 
environmental policy such as water policy. Many observers have traced the failings of 
existing global governance architectures to the lack of hard law at the international level. 
However, recent work on international regimes, especially that dealing with regime 
fragmentation and the interplay between regimes, suggests that the ‘failure’ of a regime to 
develop ‘hard law’ may simply reflect the lack of need for such efforts. This work has 
highlighted the corresponding need to deal with an issue at a national or local level. Efforts 
at these levels, however, have also often failed, in large measure due to the inability of 
national governments to control private sector actors. Much can be learned in water policy 
from other sectoral experiences in institutional policy design and this paper examines the 
nature of regime complexes in Forestry and Migration in order to draw lessons for 
international water policy-making. Both experiences suggest the correct approach to the 
problem on the part of domestic governments is to focus on multi-level governance (MLG) 
and the tools and instruments required to put an effective multi-level architecture in place. 
Water policy-making may be better served by regional agreements than by efforts to 
develop national or international regimes. 
 
 
The Challenge of Global Policy integration: Strong vs Weak Regimes in International 
Political Economy 
 
International regimes that attempt to govern the use of natural resources face many 
challenges. On the one hand, most states regard the disposition of natural resources within 
their jurisdiction (including those found in and under oceans) as a purely domestic policy 
question and often resent international regimes which attempt to deal with this issue as 
these are seen as an affront to national sovereignty. On the other hand, the use of the world's 
natural resources raises complex problems of coordination where questions of trade, 
ecological sustainability and biodiversity conservation, climate change, the rights of 
3 
 
indigenous peoples, economic development and many others intersect and interact, 
requiring some form of trans-national co-ordination.  
 
A key feature of the architecture of policy in some key areas such as banking and 
finance, health or trade is the existence of international regimes, broadly defined as “sets 
of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around 
which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations” (Krasner 
1985: 2).  
 
As the scope and ambition of global governance have increased over the past three 
decades, the relatively simple issue areas tackled by early international regimes, such as 
the regulation of discrete activities like whaling or the production of ozone-depleting 
substances have given way to much more complex policy problems such as climate change, 
biodiversity conservation, transformational technologies or deforestation.  
 
Many sectors lack either or both of the binding international agreements and 
institutions, or the common sets of norms and expectations with which to form the basis of 
a traditional hard-law regime. While global governance arrangements for natural resources 
vary, they often strike observers as imperfect or even lacking entirely and requiring 
amelioration. Richard Tarasofsky(1999:10) for example has argued that overlaps and 
duplication in cross-sectoral areas such as agriculture and mining, combined with 
uncertainties linked to patterns of trade and other similar factors, require the creation of 
more integrated treaty regimes in these areas. But while some issues such as climate change 
can be plausibly represented as problems of the global commons, others such as 
conservation of migratory fish stocks or the preservation of water quality in a large river 
basin affected by mining may concern only a few countries making achievement of binding 
international accords more difficult.  
 
It is thus not unusual that an integrated international regime does not exist in many 
areas. Most areas of social, political, economic or cultural life are not governed through the 
use of well-integrated international regimes and such arrangements in fact are much rarer 
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than commonly assumed. ‘Regime complexes’, “an array of partially overlapping and non-
hierarchical institutions governing a particular issue area (Raustiala and Victor 2004), 
rather, are quite common. Such “non-regimes”, as Radoslav Dmitrov terms them, are 
transnational policy issue areas characterized by the absence of multilateral institutions for 
ordering actors’ interactions where (1) there are issues around which states have raised 
concerns but done little to address them, (2) there are networks of states that have attempted 
and failed to sign a binding agreement but have endorsed nonbinding policy initiatives, and 
(3) there are issues around which no transnational advocacy groups exist even though 
observers identify them as problem areas (p. 5). Regime complexes have been observed 
with respect to climate change, forests and many other complex issue areas (Keohane and 
Victor 2011; Colgan, Keohane and Van de Graf 2012). This kind of institutional 
complexity will almost inevitably involve the appearance of multiple goals and 
instruments, while the absence of hierarchical arrangements will tend to make conflicts 
between them difficult to resolve.  
 
Orsini, Morin and Young have noted this tendency of regime complexes to embody 
contradictory elements. On their view, while existing regimes can overlap and coexist 
when it comes to the treatment of a novel or emergent issue area, it is the presence of 
“divergence regarding the principles, norms, rules or procedures of their elemental 
regimes”  (2012: 29) that characterizes a true regime complex. In such circumstances, 
Briassoulis (2005a) argues, policy-makers should try to integrate existing policies, 
reconciling overlaps and duplications and seeking consistency and coherency in the 
creation of new governance strategies that address interrelated policy problems using 
existing policy elements. This is not an unproblematic activity, however, and exactly how 
to better integrate elements of a regime complex outside of its transitioning to become a 
hard-law regime is a key question in many policy sectors. 
 
This analysis is very relevant in the case of international resource policy and 
environmental relationships in an area like water policy and much can be learned in water 
policy from other sectoral experiences with such complexes. This paper examines the 
nature of regime complexes in forestry and migration in order to draw lessons for 
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international water policy-making. Both experiences suggest a useful approach to the 
problem on the part of domestic governments is to focus on multi-level governance (MLG) 
and the tools and instruments required to put an effective multi-level architecture in place. 
Water policy-making in particular, it is argued, may be better served by regional 
agreements than by efforts to develop only national or international regimes. 
 
The Dynamics of Non-Regimes: Efforts at Integrating Regime Complexes 
 
Disorganized policy mixes have been widely observed in both international and 
domestic policy regime complexes (Bode 2006; Butler 2009) and become the starting point 
for attempts to reimpose coherence and consistency in a domain through policy 
replacement processes. Policy-making at all levels involves the attempt to match policy 
goals and means, preferably in such a fashion that high-level policy goals and programme-
level objectives, and general sets of policy instruments and their more precise calibration 
are coherent, consistent and cohesive(Hall 1993; Howlett and Cashore 2009; Howlett and 
Rayner 2007). The challenge of policy-making, however, is multiplied when (a) policy 
goals and means exist in a complex multi-level governance arrangement and (b) developing 
new policies involves reforming or replacing existing elements in such a policy mix 
(Cashore and Howlett 2007; Howlett and Rayner 2007; Howlett and del Rio 2015).  
 
Fragmentation (and integration) is thus seen as a key contributors to the dynamics 
and tools required to ensure regime effectiveness (Young 1999: Hafner 2003). Unmanaged 
conflict, for example, may result in the failure of an existing regime or the movement of a 
fragmented non-regime from a synergistic mode to a conflictive one (Dimitrov 2006; 
2007), but more typically fragmentation is accepted as a fact of life and more or less 
successfully managed. In their 2009 study, Biermann et al. argued that governance 
architectures for international regime complexes can be ranged along a continuum from 
integrated to fragmented. They identified three types of complexes: synergistic, co-
operative, and conflictual (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1 - Types of International Regimes 
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Source: Adapted from Biermann et al. 2009a, 2009b, 2008 
 
Integration involves the alteration of specific elements of existing policy ‘mixes’ - 
the goals, objectives and calibrations of existing policy tools - in order to produce a new 
policy mix, in the expectation of avoiding the counterproductive or sub-optimal policy 
outcomes associated with the old regime.1 Policy integration through hard law is one way 
this can be accomplished but is neither the only nor necessarily the best way to improve 
global governance arrangements for policy governance in non-regime situations.  
 
Efforts to create better integrated governance architectures, however are commonly 
employed to simplify and reform such complex policy situations. They involve efforts to 
(re)construct policy mixes in order to better match the relationships existing between 
multiple policy goals and means (Briassoulis 2005) and are specifically intended to address 
the perceived shortcomings of previous, more ad hoc regimes by ‘rationalizing’ multiple 
goals and combining policy instruments in new ways, so that these instruments support 
rather than undermine one another in the pursuit of policy goals (Grabosky 1995). Thus 
they are attempts to integrate existing, and sometimes competing, policy initiatives into a 
cohesive strategy; to coordinate the activities of multiple agencies and actors; and, 
generally, to substitute a more holistic approach to a problem for one that has decomposed 
policy into a set of multiple and loosely linked problems and solutions (May 2005; 
Briassoulis 2004, 2005; Stead et al, 2004; Meijers and Stead 2004).  
 
In this context Thelen and others have identified several typical processes through 
which complex policy mixes have evolved over time (Thelen 2003; Streeck and Thelen 
2005; Hacker 2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2005). Studies of institutional reform efforts in 
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complex policy arenas such as healthcare, pensions, and urban transportation have revealed 
that existing policy mixes typically emerge through one or more of four common processes: 
‘drift’, ‘conversion’, ‘layering’ and ‘exhaustion/replacement’ (Beland, 2007; Thelen 2003 
and 2004; Hacker 2004a, 2004b, 2004c; Stead and Meijers, 2004; Evers and Wintersberger 
1990; Evers 2005; Briassoulis 2005).2 
 
This way of thinking about regime complexes highlights the critical importance of 
better understanding how regime complexes emerge, the interactions of the component 
institutions and actors within the complex and the subsequent way they handle divergence. 
The existing empirical evidence shows that many policy regimes or mixes have developed 
haphazardly through unco-ordinated processes of policy layering, or repeated bouts of 
policy conversion or policy drift, in which new institutional arrangements have been piled 
on top of older ones, creating the palimpsest-like mixture of divergent policy elements 
(Carter 2012). Colgan and his colleagues demonstrate the operation of these processes in 
the evolution of the global energy regime complex between 1950 and 2010, identifying no 
fewer than eleven institutional arrangements with overlapping memberships in a layered 
configuration.  
 
In practice existing complex multi-level international regimes have very much 
resisted efforts to re-organize and integrate their apparently disparate elements (Puzl 2009; 
Tarasofsky 1999; McDermott et al 2007). Disagreements over whether older arrangements 
are truly exhausted, together with the conversion of apparently defunct arrangements to 
new purposes both figure in the institutional dynamics of such regime complexes. Hence 
overcoming the contextual “stickiness” of earlier regime elements is critical to the success 
of  any reform efforts (Saglie 2006; Keysar 2005).  
 
These forms of regime complexes are not restricted to natural resource and 
environmental policy issues, but are very common in this area. Efforts to expand the spatio-
temporal range of policy concerns to those involved with complex ecosystem-level 
interactions associated with the desire to attain inter-generational equity or ‘sustainability’ 
(Witter et al 2006; Johannesen 2006; Fischer et al 2007; Vince 2007) since the 1980s, for 
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example, have often resulted in additional layering or conversion of existing regime 
elements in older resource sectors. In order to illustrate the issues involved with such 
regimes in the global political economy, the case of the international forest regime (or non-
regime) is illustrative as is the case of international migration. The first is a good example 
of a natural resource regime which has resisted rationalization through treaties or other 
forms but which also cannot operate effectively at the national level alone (Overdevest and 
Zeitlin, 2012). The second illustrates these same issues in a non-resource case. Both cases 
provide valuable lessons for improving the existing water policy complex which is 
discussed in the following section. 
 




The international forest policy regime is a good example of what Biermann et al 
(2009) have termed a ‘conflictive’ regime complex (Humphreys 1996; Tarasofsky 1995, 
1999; Braatz, 2003; Puzl 2009; Giessen 2013). In the case of forests, critics of existing 
arrangements such as Tarasofsky (1999) have argued for a hard-law solution to the current 
state of fragmentation, arguing that the centre piece of a more highly integrated 
arrangement should be a legally binding convention ratified by a significant number of 
states, administered by a secretariat hosted by a well-regarded international organization, 
such as the United Nations. However it is by no means obvious that effective policy-
making in this sector requires the transition to such a traditional ‘hard law’ based policy 
regime (Florini and Sovacool, 2009). And regime (re-)construction efforts at the 
international level in this sector have also proven that such a solution is a very challenging 
project with a very mixed track record of success.  
 
As is well known, efforts to negotiate a legally binding international instrument 
covering the conservation and sustainable management of the world’s forest have failed 
repeatedly. In the forestry case, there have been three failed attempts to negotiate a binding 
international convention on forest protection and management (Humphreys, 1996 and 
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2001). These failures have led to a growing movement for third party certification of 
‘sustainable’ forestry, and in a number of government-sponsored regional initiatives to 
develop criteria and indicators of sustainable forest management to guide policy 
development, reporting, and benchmarking. In both cases, several important international 
conventions are indirectly relevant to forest and coastal zone management, including the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, and the Ramsar Convention on the conservation of 
wetlands. A number of legally binding international instruments in other areas also do 
make explicit mention of forests. There is also a host of other initiatives at the international 
and regional levels that address forests, such as climate change negotiations, which add 
additional elements and features to this architecture. Together with the forest-specific 
efforts mentioned above constitute an inchoate global governance regime complex for 
forests.  
 
Resistance to the idea that forest issues are global rather than local (Dimitrov 2005; 
Betsill et al. 2007), continuing opposition to the norms of Sustainable Forest 
Management(SFM) by many influential NGOs, for example (Humphreys 2001, 2004), and 
the parallel development of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and climate 
change regimes (Gehring and Oberthur 2009) all pose significant challenges to the 
achievement of more cooperative relationship among the various elements of the “non-
regime complex”, broadly defined.  
 
International forestry relations thus are not, at their core, an international treaty 
regime. Some (e.g. Braatz 2003) have argued that all is well and the development of a 
better integrated regime is proceeding apace: 
 
Today there is a rich mix of "soft law" and legally-binding commitments 
on forests at the global level.... Over the past decade, many legally binding 
global conventions and agreements related to forests have been ratified. 
There has been a strengthening of regional agreements on forests in recent 
years.... Steps have been taken to increase collaboration and cooperation 
among these bodies. The development of multi-stakeholder processes in 
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various international policy fora and new partnerships are providing 
increased opportunities for non-governmental, scientific, business, 
indigenous peoples and other organizations to participate in international 
decision-making and implementation of commitments (Braatz 2003).  
 
However, most, like Puzl (2009) have argued the opposite; that the regime is a 
failure or at best very partially successful in some area and is much in need of reform: 
 
No forest convention could be agreed to as the definition of tropical forests 
as global commons was linked to their availability and not to global functions 
(e.g. for example like in the discussion on biodiversity), or to the terms of 
utilisation and in this sense it was closely linked to sovereignty issues. The 
definition of tropical forests as global commons can thus be understood as the 
execution of Foucauldian power. The problem definition (tropical forests as 
global commons) did not fit the envisaged problem solution (protection of 
tropical forests by global instrument) and thus lead to a north/south division 
among countries (Puzl 2009 p. 11). 
 
The existing fragmented international regime in this sector, as in many other resource 
sectors, has resulted from continued multiple layering processes which ultimately produced 
arrangements of policy elements that are both complex and costly to administer, often 
contain counter-productive instrument mixes and incoherent goals, but, while ‘illogical’ 
are nevertheless very difficult to change, since even the dysfunctional elements of existing 
regimes can confer benefits on well-entrenched interests who may resist their alteration or 
elimination (Beland 2007; Grabosky 1995; Pierson 1993). 
 
While efforts to promote a hard law international regime have failed to overcome 
fragmentation and generate integrated policy outcomes, many issues in this sector can be 
dealt with at a national level, bilaterally among nations or at a multi-lateral, but regional, 
level. Unlike the situation with regimes in areas such as world trade and finance, co-
ordination in many natural resource and environmental sectors may be better served by de-
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centralized, regional or national level initiatives (Weiss 1998 and 1999; Biermann 2008 
and 2009; Dmitrov 2006). This regime impacts on the national level by prescribing or 
demanding detailed objectives and plans for implementation of specific aspects of forest-
related industrial and other activity at both the international, national and local levels. 
Recent initiatives include multi-national regional agreements, public-private partnerships 
and schemes for private governance such as forest certifications. Some of these 
arrangements are explicitly designed to implement intergovernmental agreements; others 




These same issues are illustrated in the case of the international migration. Migration 
represents one of the most important challenges for governance today and the stakes 
involved in effective management of human mobility have never been greater (Betts, 2011; 
Ghosh, 1999; Koslowski, 2009; Martin and Martin, 2006, Kunz et al, 2011). There is no 
formal multilateral institutional framework that regulates international migration and states 
response to it and this sector, like forestry, involves instead a regime complex, although 
one which is more ‘co-operative’ than conflictive in nature (Biermann et al 2009). 
 
The UNHCR defines international governance of migration as a process in which 
the combined framework of legal norms and organizational structures regulate and shape 
how states act in response to international migration, addressing rights and responsibilities 
and promoting international cooperation. Even though many countries now recognize that 
they have an interest in international dialogue and cooperation in the field of migration, 
there is less clarity on what that means in terms of the framework of legal norms and 
organizational structures.  
 
The post war international order has been marked by multilateralism and the 
building of liberal regimes for sectors such as trade and finance with the creation of GATT, 
WTO, and IMF. These have in turn reduced the risks of openness for national economies 
and they have stimulated international exchange across the board (Hollifield, 2009). There 
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have been similar efforts to create migration regimes to better manage the migration of 
people by various countries and institutions as well, but, as in the forest policy case, have 
largely failed.  
 
There have been efforts to create a migration regime where a single treaty would 
address various aspects of international migration and countries that would sign and ratify 
them would then be bound by it. The UN Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all 
Migrant workers and members of their Families is an example of such an effort.  It is one 
of the most detailed conventions in setting out norms related to migrant rights. But this 
convention has only been ratified by 47 countries to date and has not come into effect. No 
major destination country of international migrants is among its state parties.  
 
There have been other multilateral treaties in addition to the UN Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of all Migrant workers and members of their Families such as the 
ILO conventions. They have also suffered the same fate as the UN convention, with very 
few ratifications. The ILO's Migration for Employment Convention (No 97) has only been 
ratified by 49 countries while only 23 countries have ratified the Convention on Migration 
in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of 
Migrant Workers (No 143). Other multilateral efforts include the Global Forum on 
Migration and Development (GFMD), which has recently emerged as a site for multilateral 
dialogue on migration and development. 
 
According to Koslowski, an international migration regime has not formed at the 
global level for at least three reasons: 1) Migration destination states have no reason to join 
an international regime to facilitate labor migration; 2) there is no inherent reciprocity 
similar to that of international trade; and 3) there is no leadership from major migration 
destination states (Koslowski, 2011). These obstacles defy the best efforts of international 
organizations, international NGOs and migration origin states to promote cooperation and 




There are both practical and political obstacles that are preventing the ratification 
of the convention and the creation of a ‘hard-law regime. At the practical level, the 
convention is an extensive and complex document that raises questions on technical issues 
but it also those related to financial obligations for states. Some states fear that 
irreconcilable differences would develop and some also believe that it requires states to 
protect the rights of irregular migrants, limiting their capacity to deter irregular migration. 
Even though the convention includes provisions requiring states to cooperate in combating 
irregular migration, many states do not see them as a sufficient counterbalance to those that 
enumerate the rights of irregular migrants.  
 
As with their forest resources, states have been wary of putting international 
migration on the international agenda as the issue almost defines sovereignty- who enters 
and remains on a state's territory. Many migrant-receiving countries have resisted global 
governance of migration as it is seen to imply binding norms, formal multilateralism and 
requirement to work with the UN system. On the other hand, there is also a relatively strong 
track record of international cooperation on a range of issues closely related to migration, 
migrants and their rights. Such cooperation has helped deal with problems such as refugees, 
labor migration and counter-trafficking initiatives. 
 
With tensions between economic interest, security considerations and humanitarian 
commitments, governments have been very careful not to tie their hands through new 
international norms. Receiving states usually have had little incentive to cooperate or to 
build regimes for managing labor migration. One reason is because of an unlimited supply 
of unskilled labor available in many regions. For developed states in particular, the cost of 
participating in a regime for international migration would seem to outweigh the benefits. 
For them, a short-term strategy of unilateral or bilateral regulation of migration is preferred 
to a long term, multilateral strategy. 
While most would agree that there is no overarching migration regime to deal with 
all migration related issues, several sub-regimes have been identified. Betts (2011) writes 
that with the notable exception of the refugee regime, there is no formal or comprehensive 
multilateral regime regulating how states can and should respond to the movement of 
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people across national borders, and no overarching UN organization monitoring states' 
compliance with norms and rules. Rey Koslowski (2011), on the other hand, writes that 
global mobility is managed by three distinct sub-regimes rather than one comprehensive 
regime: those for refugees, those regarding international travel and the nearly non-existent 
regime governing labor mobility.  
 
Even though a single agency within the international system for overseeing state 
cooperation on migration management may not be found, it does not mean that 
international migration today is free of international governance. On the contrary, a 
multitude of international norms and cooperation agreements have proliferated over recent 
years creating a regime complex instead. There is a complex network of inter-governmental 
organization within and outside the UN that focus on specific aspects of international 
migration and the elements of a multi-level system of governance exists in the sector which 
can be seen in the various layers of government found at the bilateral level, regional level 
and international level. Countries have been working to find different avenues to address 
problems and concerns related to migration at the national and regional level in addition to 
the international level.  
 
Many receiving countries which have refused to sign and ratify international 
treaties have argued that their national laws are sufficient in providing for the welfare of 
migrants. But they tend to also prefer and develop bilateral agreements with supplier 
countries linking security aspects of migration control with measures on economic 
migration and development cooperation. Even though such bilateral agreements carry 
considerable transaction costs, they are still attractive to receiving countries as they 
encourage sending countries to collaborate with them in fighting unwanted migration in 
exchange for improved channels for legal migration. Kunz (2011) notes that in general 
terms, bilateralism consolidates existing asymmetries between cooperating countries since 
it rules out the possibility of creating alliances among the weaker partners with a view to 
raising their bargaining leverage. So, the advantages that multilateralism offers to 'weaker' 
migrant source countries is one of the reasons why powerful states prefer to collaborate at 




Regional consultative Processes (RCPs) are also growing in popularity as they fall 
between the one-on-one agreements between countries and international treaties that may 
include many rights but are not (yet) in effect. Regional consultations offer a chance for 
several countries to form a block to have greater leverage while bargaining with receiving 
countries. RCPs, while mostly informal, are useful in sharing information and best 
practices, which can then contribute towards possible future collaborations in bilateral, 
regional and international agreements. An example of such a regional consultative process 
is the Colombo Process, which was a meeting between Ministers of several Asian sending 
countries in 2003 to talk about the management of overseas employment and contractual 
employment. The first meeting included 10 Asian sending countries (now 11) but has since 
involved many of the major receiving countries as Observer countries (8), with 
participation from some international and regional organizations as well.  
 
There have been claims that a single hard-law migration regime would ensure 
greater orderliness and predictability in movements of people, serving and balancing the 
interests of the sending and receiving countries and the migrants alike. This vision relating 
to a single, formal, multilateral institution to address migration, however, no longer seems 
relevant in this sector as, just as in forestry, countries have not been able to coordinate to 
find a solution which appeals to everyone. The regime complex for migration instead 
displays the fragmented and multi-layered approach to migration governance but also 
shows how the failure to create a hard-law regime has led nations to explore other avenues, 
individually and collectively, through a combination of regional and bilateral cooperation 





The Need for Better Multi-Level Governance: Lessons for International Water Policy 
as a Fragmented Regime 
 
Like forestry and migration, global water governance is a regime complex which 
includes a plethora of agreements and conventions lacking a central treaty or governing 
institution. Some of the major ones include the 1997 UN convention of watercourses, 
which is not yet in force; the adoption of the Millennium Development Goals, which 
includes the goal to halve the proportion of people who are unable to reach, or to afford 
safe drinking water and sanitation facilities by 2015; the General Comment of the Right to 
Water adopted by the UN Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in 2002; 
along with international forums such as the World Water Forum, the World Water Council, 
or the Global Water Partnership (Dellapenna and Gupta, 2009). 
 
UN Water was established in 2003 as an umbrella mechanism to coordinate the 25 
UN agencies working on water.  Global UN efforts began with the Declaration of the UN 
Conference on the Human Environment in 1972, followed by the Mar Del Plata Conference 
in 1977, the UN Water and Sanitation Decade in the 1980s, the adoption of Chapter 18 in 
Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration at the UN Conference on Environment and 
Development in 1992, and the Johannesburg Conference on Sustainable Development in 
2002. But, as Baumgartner and Pahl-Wostl (2013) write in their analysis of UN Water, the 
UN–Water, as an interagency coordination mechanism lacks direct control by an 
intergovernmental governing body and, thus, lacks formal decision-making power, and is 
constrained to operate in the background of global water governance. 
 
Besides the UN related meetings, there are other bodies that meet and discuss water 
issues such as the Dublin Conference of 1992, the emergence of Integrated Water 
Resources Management (IWRM) and establishment of forums such as the World Water 
Forum, the World Water Council and the Global Water Partnership (Schnurr 2008). Even 
with such efforts, a coordinated global water policy framework still does not exist today. 
As Pahl-Wostl et al. (2008) concluded, Global Water Governance is currently “diffuse and 
mobius web-like in character. A lack of strong motivation on the part of UN agencies and 
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states to push water management has encouraged the rise of pluralistic bodies that try to 
deal with these issues. However, it is not clear that these polycentric governance 
frameworks can be more successful in generating the necessary political will for global 
action”.  
 
Like forests, water was historically viewed as a local issue with water-related 
scarcity problems addressed at the local or regional scale. The traditional view of water 
resource management has been that since the mobility of water was confined within river 
basins - areas in which surface runoff and streams converge towards a single water course 
(Gawel and Bernsen, 2011) – then governance arrangements should also be organized at 
this scale. According to Young et al. (1994) what happened to the water within one river 
basin usually had little or no direct bearing on what happened within another basin, unless 
there were inter-basin transfers. It was viewed that pollution in one basin would move from 
upstream to downstream water within the basin but would usually not be transferred to 
another basin. So it was argued the management of water in one continent did not have any 
direct effect to the management of water in another continent, for example, and hence 
international governance arrangements were not necessary except in the areas of trans-
boundary flows, necessitating bilateral rather than multilateral agreements. From this kind 
of reasoning, it was argued that water-related activities were best organized and 
coordinated within the river basin units.  Earlier summits and agreements such as the 
Agenda 21 and the protocol of the 1992 Rio Earth Summit and the European Union’s Water 
Framework Directive explicitly stated that water resources should be managed at the river 
basin level.  
 
This notion of water resource management at the river-basin level, however, is 
increasingly being contested today by pointing to global linkages which exist between 
water and climate change which require a global governance approach. Growing pressure 
on the world’s water resources has lead to growing recognition that the scope and 
complexity of water-related challenges go beyond national and regional boundaries and 
cannot be adequately addressed only through national-level policies. The Global Water 
Partnership Framework for Action at the 2000 World Water Forum in the Hague stated that 
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“the water crisis is often a crisis of governance” and identified making water governance 
effective as one of the highest priorities for action.  
 
The need for global water governance (GWG) has been put forward as many water 
related problems and conflicts are beyond the scope of national, and local governance. 
Pahl-Wost et al. (2008) define global water governance as “the development and 
implementation of norms, principles, rules, incentives, informative tools, and infrastructure 
to promote a change in the behavior of actors at the global level in the area of water 
governance.”  
 
Water governance in this sense refers to the range of political, social, economic and 
administrative systems that are in place to develop and manage water resources, and the 
delivery of water services, at different levels of society (Global Water Partnership, 2002). 
GWG focuses on the processes of international cooperation and multilateralism, 
comprising formal and informal instruments created to balance interests and meet global 
water challenges that span national and regional boundaries (Cooley et al., 2013). Global 
governance of water also includes many policy fields such as energy, agriculture and trade 
and need to be adaptive and inclusive in nature.  
 
There have been several arguments made in favor of the need for global water 
governance as a major global public good (Pahl-Wostl et al 2008). Other arguments include 
a) recognition of the global nature of hydrological system and connections with other 
global resource systems; b) recognition of the interrelationship between global 
environment change and socio-economic processes, because of which the driving forces of 
problems are beyond national or regional jurisdictions; c) local phenomena may cumulate 
to serious global trends that require a global approach; and d) the direct and indirect impacts 
of changes in water management may have global repercussions (Pahl-Wostl et al. 2008).  
 
Managing water in the contemporary era thus occurs within a regime complex 
involving multiple stakeholders from all levels of government with different views and 
objectives as well as between governments. As in forestry and migration, the multilevel 
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character of water governance means the global level does not act independently and 
cannot be studied separately from the lower levels of governance at the local and national 
levels. As Dellapenna and Gupta (2009) write, water law and policy today is a patchwork 
of local customs and rules, national legislation, regional agreements, and global treaties 
creating a global legal governance framework. Governance systems are in a state of flux 
as there has been a shift in the location of governance but no corresponding shift in the 
rules of engagement to guarantee legality, legitimacy, accountability, transparency, and the 
rule of law. Water law is slowly moving forward with more and more regional agreements, 
more administrative law frameworks, and more joint water bodies at all levels of 
governance from community through to global levels. This slow move towards global level 
agreements shows that there is some progress towards Global Water Governance but a lack 
of effective multi-level management can hinder the efficient design and implementation of 
water policy governance and reform, nationally and internationally. 
 
Conclusion: Towards a Multi-Level Governance Alternative. Enhancing Polycentric 
Forms of Governance in Regime Complexes 
 
Improving existing regime complexes in areas without traditional hard law treaty 
regimes is an issue which has come onto the policy agenda as regime complexes have failed 
to deal with issues such as resource depletion and climate change. As we have seen, 
disorganization in such complexes is a very common outcome of long periods of 
incremental policy change characterized by processes of layering and drift. While opening 
up space for local innovation, disorganization frustrates effective implementation, fuelling 
demands for more integrated strategies that would allow multiple stakeholders to operate 
in a new, common, and credible policy framework.  
 
Although the difficulties of co-ordinating government responses across non-treaty 
sectors in efforts to promote integration are well known (see for example Saglie 2006; 
Witter et al 2006; Martinez de Anguita et al 2008) they have not been effectively addressed 
as much debate continues to centre on hard-law options or strictly national level initiatives 
rather than deal with the complexities of multi-level arrangements. Attaining requisite 
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levels of multi-sectoral co-ordination is difficult in a multi-level system of governance with 
relatively fixed jurisdictional limits between levels of government (Hooghe and Marks 
2001 and 2003; Torenvlied and Akkerman 2004; Hogl 2002; Mackendrick 2005; Westcott 
2002; Fafard 2000).  
 
As these case studies show, the solution to many problems of international and 
national level fragmentation in the water sector, as in many others both resource and non-
resource oriented in nature, involves better efforts at creating effective or integrated multi-
level governance (MLG) arrangements across the sub-national, national regional and 
international levels rather than towards creation of the kinds of hard-law regimes found in 
other areas such as trade and finance. 
 
That is, as van Asselt (2007) and Oberthur 2009) set out, international water 
management may take the form of  (a) creation of a new international governor or (b) a set 
of institutions and instruments which allow positive ‘interplay’ among regime elements. 
But the former has been the subject of many efforts in the three sectors examined above, 
all with negative outcomes. More efforts of the latter type, therefore, are required in these 
areas. Themes that are worth exploring in the first instance include the importance of 
governance at the appropriate scale, for example, building on the relative success of 
regional agreements and using the principle of subsidiarity in global resource governance 
as a tool to promote positive interactions (Hogl 2000; Carozza 2009; van Kersbergen and 
Verbeek 2007). Similarly, in the second case, the multi-level governance literature is an 
important source of information on the kinds procedural instruments that can be used to 
create cooperative relationships between international, regional and national levels (Bauer 
2006; Monni and Raes 2008; Nilsson et al. 2009; Torrenvlied and Akkerman 2004).3 
 
EU environmental policy-making is a good example of how a de-centralized 
management system can operate in practice to promote policy integration even in the 
absence of hard law. The EU level provides a political arena for co-ordinating national 
policies and positions in the context of international processes. Secondly, although the 
European Union Treaties make no provision for common EU policies in many resource 
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and environmental sectors, there is a large body of EU policies that affects these sectors 
either directly or indirectly. Community actions forests in the EU, for example, are linked 
to goals pursued by other sectoral policies, in particular the Common Agricultural Policy, 
environment, and rural development policies. Thirdly, the evolution of a multi-level system 
of joint decision-making has brought about substantial changes in the logic of influence for 
domestic actors. The supranational level comprises new actors and institutionalised arenas, 
provides additional points of access, and requires the actors to broaden their perspectives.  
 
As discussed above, responsive policy-making on large-scale complex 
international resource and environmental policy issues such as water lacking treaty regimes 
requires problems to be dealt with on a multi-level and multi-sectoral basis (Weber et al 
2007; Gerber et al 2009). For the reasons noted above, efforts in this direction are more 
likely to bear fruit than the many efforts over the past half century which have been 
designed to create ‘hard’ law treaty regimes in these sectors but have failed to produce 
tangible results to date. 
 
Endnotes 
1In evaluating these complexes Howlett and Rayner (2007) have focused attention 
on the manner in which existing mixes retain or do not retain coherent goals and consistent 
means. The extent of consistency and coherency must be evaluated empirically on a case-
by-case basis, but policy goals are typically considered as coherent if they are logically 
related to the same overall policy aims and objectives and can be achieved simultaneously 
without any significant trade-offs. They are incoherent if they contain major contradictions, 
i.e. goals which cannot be achieved simultaneously and lead to the attainment of only some 
or none of the original objectives; for example, simultaneously promoting both large 
vehicle sales to encourage employment and fuel efficiency standards to enhance energy 
conservation. Policy tools are consistent when they work together to support a policy goal. 
They are inconsistent when they work against each other and are counter-productive, for 
example, providing simultaneous incentives and disincentives towards the attainment of 
stated policy goals such as rent controls and construction subsidies in attempting to provide 
housing for lower income citizens. 
 
2 Layering is a process whereby new goals and instruments are simply added to old 
ones in an existing regime without abandoning previous ones, often leading to both 
incoherence amongst the goals and inconsistency with respect to instruments used (Beland 
2007). Drift occurs when new goals replace old ones without changing the instruments 
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used to implement them. These instruments then can become inconsistent with the new 
goals and most likely ineffective in achieving them (Torenvlied and Akkerman 2004). 
Conversion involves the reverse situation whereby new instrument mixes evolve while 
holding old goals constant. If the old goals lack coherence, then changes in policy 
instruments often may either reduce levels of implementation conflicts or enhance them, 
but are unlikely to succeed in matching means and ends of policy (Thelen 2005). 
Replacement occurs when there is a conscious effort made to re-create or fundamentally 
re-structure policies through the replacement of old goals and means by new ones so that 
they both become consistent, coherent and congruent (Eliadis, Hill and Howlett 2005; 
Gunningham and Sinclair 1999). Replacement sometimes comes about from the 
recognition that previous institutional arrangements have exhausted their problem solving 
capacities, leading key actors to defect to new arrangements.  
 
3 The MLG literature (Hooghe and Marks 2001 and 2003) has distinguished 
between two kinds of MLG, Type I, the traditional territorial division of labour found in 
federal systems and type II, where "there is a need for a tailored governmental body to 
address an issue that is not susceptible to policy action by a Type I organization, for 
example, in the international arena and when there are particular functional governance 
problems" (Skelcher 2005). As Skelcher notes, however the two types typically exist side 
by side in polycentric governance arrangements and while the version where a Type II 
institution is embedded  in a traditional state form (e.g. an agency in a state) has been 
widely studied, the reverse is equally common, namely states embedded in an international 
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